Abstract-In settings of incomplete information, we put forward
INTRODUCTION
We focus on settings of incomplete information. Here, a player i knows precisely θ i , his own (payoff) type, but not θ −i , the type subprofile of his opponents. Accordingly, he may have all kinds of beliefs (even wrong ones) about θ −i . We refer to such beliefs as i's external beliefs, and to θ i as his internal knowledge.
For achieving a desired goal, a mechanism designer should in general consider leveraging both the players' internal knowledge and their external beliefs. Mechanisms working in dominant or undominated strategies leverage the former, but not the latter. 1 Bayesian mechanisms leverage both, under the assumption that the players' beliefs consist of probability distributions. 2 Such an assumption is quite natural because uncertainty is traditionally modeled by probability distributions, but is an assumption nonetheless. Independent of whatever additional assumptions may be required by specific mechanisms (e.g., that the distribution from which θ is drawn is known to the designer or is common knowledge to the players), it imposes significant structural constraints on the players' external beliefs. For instance, consider a player i who, in a single-good auction, * Supported in part by ONR Grant No. N00014-09-1-0597. 1 Whenever such mechanisms exist, they achieve their goals no matter what external beliefs the players may have. 2 For instance, when θ is assumed to be drawn from a distribution D that is common knowledge to the players, and the underlying solution concept is Bayesian equilibrium, the external belief of a player i can be taken to be D|θ i , that is, "the distribution of θ −i obtained by conditioning D on θ i ." values the item for sale 50 and believes that one of his opponents values for more than 100. Such a belief is not a distribution -i may not know whom such a high-valuing player might be, nor what the probabilities for his valuation being 101, 102, etc. might be-and is not leverageable by Bayesian mechanisms.
In sum, classical mechanisms exploit two extremesnamely, (1) the players have no external beliefs and (2) their external beliefs consist of probability distributions-but not the vast ground in between. Personally, we consider the first extreme as too pessimistic and the second as too optimistic, and wish to explore a "middle road" to mechanism design.
Our Focus While our belief model and solution concept are very general, our theorems focus solely on singlegood auctions where all valuations are non-negative integers upperbounded by some value V , and all mechanisms provide each player with a finite number of pure strategies.
The Conservative-Belief Model
Definition 1. A conservative context C consists of a tuple (n, Ω, Θ, u, θ, B), where
• (n, Ω, Θ, u, θ) is a traditional context of incomplete information, 3 and
• B is a profile such that, for each player i, (1) B i ⊆ Θ and (2) t i = θ i for all t ∈ B i . We refer to B as the conservative belief profile, and say that B i is correct if θ ∈ B i .
In a conservative context, B i represents all possible candidates for the true type profile in player i's view. ( We do not include the players' higher-level beliefs in our contexts because our solution concept prevents such beliefs from affecting a rational play of our mechanism.) Knowledge and Beliefs Components n, Ω, Θ, and u are common knowledge to everyone. Each player i individually knows θ i and B i , is rational, and believes that his opponents are rational. (Any unspecified knowledge and belief of players or mechanism designers can be chosen arbitrarily.)
Conservative Single-Good Auction Contexts A conservative single-good auction context is a conservative context (n, Ω, Θ, u, θ, B) where: Θ = {0, 1, . . . , V } n for some positive integer V referred to as the valuation bound; Ω = {0, 1, . . . , n} × R n ; 4 and each utility function u i is so defined: u i (t i , (a, P )) equals t i − P i if i = a, and −P i otherwise.
If ω = (a, P ) ∈ Ω, then player i's utility for ω, u i (ω), is u i (θ i , ω); and the revenue of ω, REV (ω), is i P i . We denote by C V n the set of all conservative single-good auction contexts with n players and valuation bound V , and by D V n the set of all contexts in C V n where the conservative belief of every player is correct.
Remarks
• Working solely in our model, we may drop the term "conservative" or use it for emphasis/clarity only. Further, since all auctions we consider are single-good, we may also omit the term "single-good." • Note that an auction context C is identified by n, V , θ and B alone: that is, C = (n, V, θ, B).
• In an auction context, a player i's true type θ i -also called i's true valuation-represents i's value for the good for sale, and i's conservative belief B i is a set of non-negative integer profiles.
• Players' beliefs can be wrong. Indeed it may even be the case that θ ∈ B i for each player i.
• The profile B is compatible with the players having additional beliefs, even of a probabilistic nature. In no case, however, can these additional beliefs contradict B. For instance, if a player i believes that the true type profile has been drawn from some distribution D, then B i should coincide with D's support.
• Conservative belief is a model rather than an assumption. As usual, a player i knows θ i , but we make no requirement about his external belief. For instance, he may have no external belief whatsoever. In this case,
On the other extreme, he may have no external uncertainty whatsoever. In this case, B i = {t} for some type profile t (not necessarily equal to θ).
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• Aiming at robustness, we are very conservative when modeling what we may exploit, but very liberal when modeling what may hurt us. That is, our mechanisms only leverage B in order to achieve their goals, but must work no matter what additional beliefs (compatible with B) the players might have.
• Relative to B, the external belief of a player i, E i , is formally defined to be the set {t −i : (θ i , t −i ) ∈ B i }.
• As a player i's type is a comprehensive description of i in the strategic situation at hand, we are essentially separating i's payoff type, θ i , from his external-belief type, E i .
Conservative-Belief Social Choice Correspondences and Their Advantages
Traditionally, social choice correspondences map type profiles to sets of (distributions over) outcomes, but can be naturally extended to map conservative-belief profiles to sets of outcomes. This extension strictly enriches the set of "targets" for mechanism design. As noted, each context C implicitly has a conservative-belief profile B, from which the true type profile θ could be easily computed. Thus, for each traditional correspondence f there exists an extended one F such that f (θ) = F (B), but not vice versa.
The advantage of a meaningful and enlarged "target space" is pretty clear. Very often we do not know how to design mechanisms implementing a given, traditional, social choice correspondence f . Sometimes we can actually prove that designing such mechanisms is impossible (at least for some type of implementation -e.g., in dominant strategies). In these cases, while one can always shop around for new, meaningful, and achievable targets among traditional social choice correspondences, extended social choice correspondences provide access to additional ones, i.e., targets that are not even expressible in terms of θ alone, more tractable, and yet reasonable. For instance, in [4] we prove the existence of a very robust mechanism that, in any truly combinatorial auction and without any knowledge about the players' true valuations, generates within a factor of 2 the "maximum revenue that a player could guarantee if he were charged to sell the goods to his competitors by means of take-it-orleave-it offers."
In this paper, rather than replacing classical social choice correspondences with "tamer" ones, we use conservative beliefs in order to define and then achieve a new correspondence "tougher" than classical ones.
The Second-Belief Revenue Benchmark
In auction contexts, a revenue benchmark F is a function mapping each conservative belief profile B to a real number. Thus, de facto, F is a social choice correspondence: the one mapping each B to the set of outcomes whose revenue is at least F (B). Let us now define a revenue benchmark for single-good auctions.
Definition 2. The second-belief benchmark, denoted by 2 nd , is the revenue benchmark so defined. For a belief profile B, let smp i = min t∈Bi max j t j for each player i. Then, 2 nd (B) is the second highest value in {smp 1 , . . . , smp n }.
If t were the true valuation profile, then max j t j would be the maximum price that a player is willing to pay for the good. Thus, relative to B i , smp i is the maximum price for which player i is sure that some player (possibly i or a player whose identity is not precisely known to i) is willing to pay for the good.
A Simple Example Consider an auction with three players where θ = (100, 80, 60), B 1 = {(100, x, y) : x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0}, B 2 = {(100, 80, x), (y, 80, 100) : x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0}, and B 3 = {(150, 0, 60)}. Here, the beliefs of players 1 and 2 are correct, but that of player 3 is wrong. Player 1 has no external beliefs: in his eyes, all valuations are possible for his two opponents. Player 2 believes that either player 1 or player 3 has valuation 100, but cannot tell whom. Player 3 has no external uncertainty: in his eyes, (150, 0, 60) is the true valuation profile. According to B, smp 1 = smp 2 = 100, smp 3 = 150, and thus 2 nd (B) = 100, which happens to be the highest valuation.
Remark Sometimes 2 nd (B) can be greater than the highest valuation, but never when all beliefs are correct. However, since smp i ≥ θ i for every player i, it is always the case that "2 nd (B) ≥ 2 nd (θ)": that is, our benchmark is always greater than or equal to the second highest true valuation. Accordingly, a mechanism designer concerned with generating revenue should try to achieve the second-belief benchmark instead of using the second-price mechanism to generate revenue equal to the second-highest valuation. If he succeeds, the seller may have something (possibly a lot) to gain and nothing to lose.
As we prove, however, this more demanding benchmark cannot be achieved via classical solution concepts.
The Impossibility of Classically Implementing the Second-Belief Benchmark
Recall that a mechanism M provides each player i with a set of pure strategies, consistently denoted by S i in this paper, and maps each strategy profile σ to an outcome (or a distribution over outcomes, if M is probabilistic or σ a mixed-strategy profile) denoted by M (σ). Also recall that a mechanism is finite if each S i is finite, and that a game G consists of a context C and a mechanism M : G = (C, M ). Finally, when the mechanism M is clear, for any strategy profile σ, we may denote u i (M (σ)) by u i (σ) for short.
For our impossibility results, we consider mechanisms that allow the players to "stay home", that is, to opt out of the auction. Otherwise, one could trivially and meaninglessly generate high revenue by forcing the players to participate in a mechanism always giving them very negative utility.
Definition 3.
A mechanism M is reasonable if it is finite and satisfies the following opt-out condition: ∀ player i ∃out i ∈ S i such that for (any possible true type θ i and) any strategy subprofile
Remarks
• Having the opt-out condition requiring i's utility to be 0 in expectation, rather than for every outcome in the support of M (out i , s −i ), can only make our impossibility results stronger.
• Our impossibility results already hold for auctions with just two players, and when all beliefs are correct. Actually, when the players' beliefs are not correct these results become trivial. 6 Accordingly, we state our impossibility results in terms of D V n instead of C V n .
• In our impossibility results we never assume any restrictions on the strategy spaces. In particular, our results also apply to normal-form mechanisms that let the players report their (alleged) conservative beliefs, as it is fair to do so when trying to leverage them.
Impossibility of Implementation in Undominated Strategies
Implementation in undominated strategies is a classical notion for settings of incomplete information. 7 We strengthen our first impossibility result by adopting a weaker notion of such implementation. 8 Notice that this weaker notion is already sufficient from a mechanism designer's point of view.
Definition 4.
A mechanism M sufficiently implements a revenue benchmark F for a class C of auction contexts in undominated strategies if, ∀ contexts C ∈ C and ∀ profiles s of undominated strategies in the game (C, M ), denoting by B the belief profile of C, we have that
in undominated strategies.
For deterministic mechanisms and purely undominated strategies, our impossibility result holds for arbitrary approximation factors. 6 This is so because, when more than one player's beliefs are not correct, it is trivial to construct contexts for which the second-belief benchmark is much greater than the highest valuation. And no classical notion of implementation can guarantee revenue greater than the highest valuation. 7 Given a game G = (C, M ), a strategy s i of player i is weakly dominated by another (possibly mixed) strategy
for every strategy subprofile s −i of the others, and u i (σ i , s −i ) > u i (s i , s −i ) for some strategy subprofile s −i . A strategy s i is undominated if it is not weakly dominated by any strategy. A strategy s i is purely undominated if it is not weakly dominated by any pure strategy. Thus, to compute his own undominated strategies in a game, a player needs not have any information about his opponents' (payoff) types. 8 Note that the traditional notion of (full) implementation in undominated strategies -see Jackson [13] -requires not only that every profile of undominated strategies yields an outcome satisfying the desired social choice correspondence, but also that, conversely, for each desired outcome there exists a profile of undominated strategies yielding that outcome. By removing the latter requirement we weaken the notion of implementation and thus strengthen the impossibility result of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. ∀ ∈ (0, 1] and ∀ V > 1/ , no reasonable deterministic mechanism sufficiently implements 2 nd for D V 2 in purely undominated strategies. The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in the full version of this paper [5] . The proof of Theorem 2 is very similar and thus omitted.
Impossibility of Implementation in Dominant Strategies
Theorems 1 and 2 immediately yield the following about strictly/weakly/very weakly dominant strategies. A Crucial Clarification Note that, Theorems 1 and 2 not withstanding, the above two corollaries would be trivial if the players were restricted to bid valuations only. In such a case, in fact, the second-price mechanism is "the only" (weakly) dominant-strategy mechanism for auctions of a single good. And since the revenue it generates is precisely equal to the second-highest valuation, no other dominantstrategy mechanism can generate second-belief revenue. "QED." We thus wish to emphasize again that all our impossibility results hold without any restrictions on strategy spaces, and in particular that a mechanism asking the players to announce conservative beliefs cannot be "simulated" by one asking them to announce only valuations.
Extra Fragility of Implementation at Some ExPost/Very Weakly Dominant Equilibria
A mechanism guaranteeing a given property at some equilibria of a given type is certainly more fragile than one guaranteeing it at all equilibria of that type. Indeed, one has no control over the equilibrium ultimately selected by the players. But mechanisms implementing 2 nd at some expost or very weakly dominant equilibria have some extra fragility. Consider the following mechanism for C 100 2 . Mechanism NAIVE. A strategy of player i has two components: an integer a i and a set b i ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , 100}. (Allegedly, a i is player i's true valuation, and b i his true external belief.) The winner and prices are decided as follows. Let w = 9 A strategy s i of player i is strictly dominant if for every other strategy
for every s −i , and the inequality is strict for some s −i . Strategy s i is very weakly dominant if for every other strategy
argmax i a i (ties broken lexicographically), and let P = min t∈B −w max j t j where B −w = {a −w }×b −w . If a w ≥ P , then the good is sold to player w, w pays P , and his opponent pays 0. Else, the good is unsold and both players pay 0. According to NAIVE, it is clear that every player announcing his true valuation and true external belief in every context is an ex-post equilibrium. When the players' beliefs are correct, this equilibrium guarantees second-belief revenue. However, consider the context C where θ = (70, 100), B 1 = {(70, x) : x ≥ 90}, and B 2 = {(x, 100) : x ≥ 60}. In this context, all beliefs are correct, 2 nd (B) = 90, the truthful ex-post equilibrium yields the strategy profile ((70, {x : x ≥ 90}), (100, {x : x ≥ 60})), and it generates revenue 90 as desired. However, it is also clear that ((70, {x : x ≥ 0}), (100, {x : x ≥ 60})) is an alternative Nash equilibrium -corresponding to another expost equilibrium-whose revenue is only 70.
In principle -e.g., when two Nash equilibria differ at multiple players, one can argue that a player may be able to establish some belief about which equilibrium is going to be played out by the others, and best respond to his belief. But in the above example, the "truthful" and the "alternative" equilibria differ only at player 1's strategy. Thus, even if player 1 believed that player 2 will play his truthful strategy, it would also be perfectly rational for player 1 to play his own alternative strategy. Viceversa, even if player 2 believed that player 1 will play his alternative strategy, it would also be perfectly rational for player 2 to stick to his own truthful strategy (which coincides with his alternative one in the above example).
Accordingly, which revenue should we expect from NAIVE at context C? The answer is 90 if player 1 is "generous" towards the seller and 70 otherwise. 10 In the full version of this paper [5] , we formalize this phenomenon and prove that such extra fragility is actually unavoidable for any mechanism implementing (or even approximating) the secondbelief benchmark at some ex-post or very weakly dominant equilibria.
Conservative Strict Implementation: Our New Solution Concept
The inability of achieving the second-belief benchmark via classical notions of implementation encourages us to 10 Notice that the truthful ex-post equilibrium actually specifies a very weakly dominant strategy for each player in each context, and thus illustrates the lack of robustness for implementation at some very weakly dominant equilibria as well. Such lack of robustness was already pointed out by Saijo, Sjostrom, and Yamato theoretically [15] and by Casona, Saijo, Sjostrom, and Yamato experimentally [2] . In [15] the authors also propose secure implementation: essentially, implementation via mechanisms ensuring that (a) each player has a very weakly dominant strategy, and that (b) the desired property holds at all Nash equilibria (and thus all very weakly dominant ones). As we have discussed, therefore, the second-belief revenue benchmark is not securely implementable.
develop a new one. Intuitively, but erroneously, our notion can be taken to consist of "two-round elimination of strictly dominated strategies" (hardly a new solution concept!). The problem is that such elimination is not well defined in a setting of incomplete information: without knowing his opponents' payoff types, a player is not capable of figuring out what strategies are left for them after the first round, and thus is not capable of figuring out which of his own strategies are dominated in the second round. Therefore we must be more careful. Our notion is formally defined in Section 3, but can be summarized as follows.
Sketch of Our Notion
1. Each player eliminates all of his strictly dominated strategies; 2. Based on his conservative belief B i , and assuming that everyone completes Step 1, each player i eliminates all his remaining strategies that are dominated relative to B i . The real novelty of our notion, and the key for meaningfully leveraging set-theoretic beliefs, lie with properly defining "domination relative to B i " in Step 2. As usual, after
Step 1, to determine which of his remaining strategies are dominated, i should know what are the currently surviving strategies of the other players. However, to figure this out, player i must also know what are the true types of the other players -which is precisely a piece of information that he does not have in a setting of incomplete information. We address this concern by breaking down Step 2 into two conceptual sub-steps as follows.
2.1 Each player i, for each type profile t in B i , computes the profile S(t), where each S(t) j represents the set of surviving strategies for player j after Step 1, if t were the true type profile.
Each player i eliminates a
Step-1 surviving strategy s i if and only if there exists another (possibly mixed)
Step-1 surviving strategy σ i that (classically) strictly dominates s i with respect to S(t) for each t ∈ B i .
Remark Let us emphasize a subtle point hidden in Step 2.2. Consider the following two ways of defining s i to be "dominated relative to B i ": (i) for each t ∈ B i , s i is strictly dominated with respect to S(t) by some σ i , and (ii) for each t ∈ B i , s i is strictly dominated with respect to S(t) by the same σ i . Although both ways are based on the players' set-theoretic beliefs B, we have adopted the latter one. The reason is that, when he eliminates a strategy s i dominated according to (ii), player i is sure to have a better strategy to play, namely σ i , no matter which type profile in B i might be the right one. But the same is not true when he eliminates a strategy dominated according to (i).
Example

11
Consider a mechanism M played by two players, where the true type profile is θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 ) , and the belief of player 1 is B 1 = {(θ 1 , θ 2 ), (θ 1 , θ 2 )}. (Since we are going to analyze only player 1's behavior, we do not need to specify B 2 nor the other possible type profiles.) The mechanism gives player 1 the pure strategies a, b, and c, and player 2 the pure strategies d and e. For each type profile in B 1 , the players' utilities under M are as follows.
Notice that, in Step 1 of our notion, player 1 cannot eliminate any strategy. Player 2 instead would eliminate d (strictly dominated by e) if his true type were θ 2 , and e (strictly dominated by d) if his true type were θ 2 . Let us now consider Step 2. If we adopted definition (i) in Step 2.2, then player 1 should eliminate strategy a, because it is strictly dominated by b with respect to his candidate type profile (θ 1 , θ 2 ), and by c with respect to his other candidate type profile (θ 1 , θ 2 ). However, whether player 1 should play b or c in place of a really depends on whether (θ 1 , θ 2 ) or (θ 1 , θ 2 ) is the true type profile. If he makes the wrong choice, then his loss is huge compared with his possible gain: namely, -100 versus 3. Without any "likelihood" associated with each candidate type profile in his belief B 1 , it might be reasonable and safer for player 1 to use a to always get utility 2. (Thus, if M banked on player 1 not choosing a in order to implement its desired social choice correspondence, it may not implement it in a robust sense.)
Mutual Belief of Rationality Implementation in dominant or undominated strategies only requires that every player is rational. Conservative strict implementation instead additionally requires that every player believes that his opponents are rational. However, it does not require "higher-level" beliefs of rationality, let alone common belief. That is, Conservative strict implementation solely relies on rationality and mutual belief of rationality. In essence, our notion is only "slightly" weaker than implementation in strictly dominant strategies, yet is defined carefully to explicitly leverage the players' beliefs about others in a robust way.
The Second-Belief Benchmark is Conservatively Strictly Implementable
Finally, we prove that conservative strict implementation succeeds where classical notions fail. Namely, under our solution concept, we exhibit a mechanism M, the secondbelief mechanism, that guarantees second-belief revenue, within an arbitrarily small additive value , in all single-good auction contexts. Our mechanism is uniformly specified for all values , numbers of players n, and valuation bounds V : M = M ,n,V . Formally, Theorem 3. For any ∈ (0, 1], n, and V , M ,n,V conservatively strictly implements 2 nd − for C V n . The second-belief mechanism is defined in Section 4 and analyzed in Section 5. In Section 6 we address three concerns raised about our mechanism.
RELATED WORK
Works centered on true-type prior distributions, known or not to the designers/players, are unrelated to our settheoretic framework. There are, however, relevant works whose probabilistic assumptions are less central. [14] studied differential information settings for exchange economies. They model a player's uncertainty as a partition of the set of all possible states of the world, and assume such partitions to be common knowledge. In our case, we do not assume a player to have any knowledge/beliefs about the knowledge/beliefs of another player, and we certainly do not have any common-knowledge requirements. In addition, they further assume that each player has a probabilistic distribution over the state space, and use Bayesian equilibrium as the key solution concept. Their model actually reduces to Harsanyi's incomplete information model [11] if the state space is finite.
Other Models of Incomplete Information Postlewaite and Schmeidler
Chung and Ely [7] model a player's belief about the state of the world via a distribution, but assume that he prefers one outcome ω to another ω if he locally prefers ω to ω in every state that is possible according to his belief. In this sense, what matters is the support of the distribution, which is set-theoretic. The authors show that, even when the players only have very small uncertainty about the state of the world, the set of social choice rules implementable at (essentially) undominated Nash equilibria is highly constrained compared with that in complete-information settings. Their result is less relevant for settings, like ours, where a player has no uncertainty about his own payoff type. In addition, in our purely set-theoretic model, we have no requirement on how big a player's uncertainty about his opponents can be. Finally, instead of studying implementation at all equilibria (of a given type), we study the fragility of implementation even at some of them.
Impossibility Results Several impossibility results have been proved for implementation in dominant strategies: for instance, for many forms of elections (see Gibbard [8] and Sattherwaite [16] ), for maximizing social welfare in a budget-balanced way (see Green and Laffont [10] and Hurwicz [12] ), and for maximizing revenue in general settings of quasi-linear utilities (see Chen, Hassidim and Micali [3] ). As for mechanisms working in undominated strategies, Jackson [13] shows that the set of social choice correspondences (fully) implementable by bounded mechanisms (which include finite ones) is quite constrained. We note, however, that none of these results imply ours for implementing the second-belief benchmark in either dominant or undominated strategies (indeed, our results do not require full implementation).
Prior-Free Mechanisms Prior-free mechanisms for auctions have also been investigated -in particular, by Baliga and Vohra [1] , Segal [17] , and Goldberg, Hartline, Karlin, Saks, and Wright [9] , although the first two of them do not consider auctions of a single good. The term "priorfree" seems to suggest that this approach be relevant to our set-theoretic setting, but things are quite different. For instance, all cited prior-free mechanisms work in dominant strategies, and we have proved that no dominant-strategy mechanism can even approximate our revenue benchmark. More generally, as for all mechanisms, prior-free ones must be analyzed based on some underlying solution concept, and as long as they use one of the solution concepts we prove inadequate for our benchmark, they would automatically fail to guarantee it.
Our Own Prior Work In [4] we studied mechanisms leveraging only (what we now call) external correct beliefs, and, as already mentioned, constructed one such mechanism for truly combinatorial auctions. (This mechanism would also work with incorrect external beliefs, but under a slightly different analysis.) In a later work with Valiant [6] , we were able to extend our combinatorial-auction mechanism so as to leverage also, to a moderate extent, the internal knowledge of the players. 12 In neither of these two prior papers we proved any impossibility results: given that no significant revenue guarantees were known for combinatorial auctions, we were satisfied with achieving new, reasonable benchmarks. Perhaps interestingly, our prior mechanisms were of extensive form, and we still do not know whether equivalent, normal-form ones exist.
CONSERVATIVE STRICT IMPLEMENTATION
The following two auxiliary definitions envisage a game with context C = (n, Ω, Θ, u, θ, B) and mechanism M (whose strategy-profile set is denoted by S as usual).
Definition 5. Let i be a player, t i a type of i, and T = T 1 × · · · × T n a set of pure strategy profiles. Then,
• We say that a strategy s i ∈ T i is strictly t i -Tdominated by another strategy
• We denote by S(t i ) the set of pure strategies of i that are not strictly t i -S-dominated, and, for any type profile t, we set S(t) = S(t 1 ) × · · · × S(t n ) and
Accordingly, s i is strictly dominated by σ i in the traditional sense if s i < θi S σ i , and S(t i ) represents the strategies of i that would survive elimination of strictly dominated strategies (in the traditional sense) if his true type were t i . Also note that, for any t ∈ B i , S(t i ) = S(θ i ), because t i = θ i , while S(t j ) and S(θ j ) may be very different for j = i. Thus, in general S(t) = S(θ) for t = θ.
Definition 6.
A strategy s i ∈ S(θ i ) is conservatively strictly dominated if there exists another strategy σ i ∈ ∆(S(θ i )) that strictly θ i -S(t)-dominates s i for all t ∈ B i . Else, s i is conservatively strictly rational.
We are now ready to define our notion of implementation.
Definition 7. We say that a mechanism M conservatively strictly implements a social choice correspondence F for a class of contexts C if, for all contexts C ∈ C and for all profiles s of conservatively strictly rational strategies in (C, M ), denoting by B the belief profile of C, we have that M (s) ∈ F (B).
THE SECOND-BELIEF MECHANISM
For any ∈ (0, 1], n, and V , the mechanism M ,n,V is described below. Note that the mechanism applies to any context in C V n , and is of normal form because the players act simultaneously and only once: in Step 1. Steps a through e are just "conceptual steps taken by the mechanism". The expression "X := x" denotes the operation that sets or resets variable X to value x.
Mechanism M ,n,V a: Set a := 0, and P i := 0 for all players i.
COMMENT. Upon termination, after all proper resettings, (a, P ) will be the final outcome.
1: Each player i, publicly and simultaneously with the others, announces a pair (e i , v i ) ∈ {0, 1}×{0, . . . , V }.
COMMENT. Allegedly, vi = smpi, and ei indicates whether i's announcement is about his internal knowledge (allegedly ei = 0 signifies that vi = θi), or about his external belief.
b: Order the announced n pairs according to v 1 , . . . , v n decreasingly, breaking ties in favor of those with e i = 13 As usual, for any set A, ∆(A) is the set of probabilistic distributions over A.
0.
If there are still ties among some pairs, then break them according to the corresponding players.
COMMENT. It does not matter whether the players are ordered lexicographically (increasingly or decreasingly), or according to some other way.
c: Set a to be the player corresponding to the first pair.
COMMENT. Player a gets the good for sure, and thus the mechanism never leaves the good unassigned.
d: If e a = 0 then P a := max j =a v j ; otherwise P a := v a .
COMMENT. If a's announcement is about himself, then he pays the second-highest vi, else the highest. e: For each player i, P i :
COMMENT. Each player i receives a reward δi.
Remark As promised, it is clear that M ,n,V is uniformly and efficiently constructible on inputs , n, and V . In addition, it is very simple. In light of our impossibility results about implementing 2 nd under classical solution concepts, this simplicity suggests that conservative strict implementation can be quite powerful.
ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND-BELIEF MECHANISM
Theorem 3. For any ∈ (0, 1], n, and V , M ,n,V conservatively strictly implements 2 nd − for C V n . Proof. Arbitrarily fix ∈ (0, 1], n, V , C = (n, V, θ, B) ∈ C V n , and a strategy profile s. Denoting M ,n,V by M for short, it suffices for us to prove that, if s is conservatively strictly rational in the game (C, M), then
Letting s i (e i , v i ) for each i, we start by proving three claims.
PROOF OF CLAIM 1. Assume for sake of contradiction that s i ∈ S(t i ) and v i < t i . We show that s i is strictly t i -Sdominated by s i = (0, t i ). By definition, this implies that s i ∈ S(t i ), a contradiction. For this purpose, letting s −i be an arbitrary strategy subprofile of −i, it suffices to show that
To do so, let δ i and δ i be the rewards that player i receives in Step e, in the plays of (s i , s −i ) and (s i , s −i ) respectively. By the construction of M we have that
where the inequality holds because v i < t i by hypothesis and e i ≥ 0 by the construction of M. Accordingly, we have
Let (a, P ) and (a , P ) be the outcomes of (s i , s −i ) and (s i , s −i ) respectively, and let s j = (e j , v j ) for each player j = i. Below we distinguish three cases. Case 1. a = i.
In this case, we also have a = i, because v i < t i . Accordingly, P i = −δ i and P i = −δ i , and thus
In this case, we have that:
According to (ii) and (iii), P i ≥ max j =i v j − δ i . This fact, combined with (i) and the fact that δ i > δ i , implies that
Case 3. a = i and a = i.
for any s −i , and thus s i is strictly t i -S-dominated by s i , contradicting the fact that s i ∈ S(t i ). Therefore Claim 1 holds. CLAIM 2. ∀ player i and ∀ type t i ∈ {0, . . . , V } of i, if
PROOF OF CLAIM 2. By definition, it suffices for us to show that s i is strictly t i -S-dominated by strategy s i = (0, t i ). For this purpose, arbitrarily fixing a strategy subprofile s −i of −i, it suffices to show that
The analysis below is very similar to that of Claim 1. Indeed, in the plays of (s i , s −i ) and (s i , s −i ) respectively, we denote by δ i and δ i the rewards that player i receives in Step e, and by (a, P ) and (a , P ) the final outcomes. Letting s j = (e j , v j ) for each player j = i, we have that
and we distinguish three cases as before:
• If a = i, then a = i as well, and we have that
• If a = i and a = i, then
, and we have that
• Otherwise, we have that a = i and a = i, which implies that
In sum, s i is strictly t i -S-dominated by s i , and Claim 2 holds.
PROOF OF CLAIM 3. Assume for sake of contradiction that s i is conservatively strictly rational and v i < smp i . By definition we have that s i ∈ S(θ i ), and thus by Claim 1 we have that v i ≥ θ i . Accordingly,
Let s i = (1, smp i ). Without loss of generality, we assume that s i ∈ S(θ i ), and prove that s i is conservatively strictly dominated by s i , which contradicts the fact that s i is conservatively strictly rational.
14 To prove this, it suffices to show that ∀t ∈ B i , s i is strictly θ i -S(t)-dominated by s i . Arbitrarily fixing a type profile t ∈ B i and a strategy subprofile s −i ∈ S(t −i ), it suffices to show that
To do so, letting δ i and δ i be the rewards that player i receives in Step e, in the plays of (s i , s −i ) and (s i , s −i ) respectively, we have that
where the first inequality holds because v i < smp i and e i ≥ 0, the second because v i < smp i , and the last because smp i ≤ V . Accordingly we again have
Let (a, P ) and (a , P ) be the final outcomes of (s i , s −i ) and (s i , s −i ) respectively, let s j = (e j , v j ) for each player j = i, and let (t) = argmax j t j with ties broken lexicographically. Because t ∈ B i , by the definition of smp i we have that smp i ≤ max j t j = t (t) , which together with the fact that t i = θ i < smp i implies that (t) = i. Further because s (t) ∈ S(t (t) ), we have that
where the first inequality holds by Claim 1 and the last one by our hypothesis about v i .
If v (t) > smp i , then by the construction of M we have that the pair announced by player (t) is ordered before that by player i in both plays. If v (t) = smp i , then we have that v (t) = t (t) , and thus e (t) = 0 by Claim 2, which again implies that the pair announced by player (t) is ordered before that by player i in both plays. Accordingly, no matter which is the case, we always have that a = i and a = i, which implies
as we wanted to show. Therefore Claim 3 holds. Now we are ready to prove that if s is conservatively strictly rational then Inequality 1 holds, which implies Theorem 3. To do so, recall that 2 nd (B) is the second highest value in {smp 1 , . . . , smp n }. Let = argmax i smp i and = argmax i = smp i , with ties broken lexicographically. By definition, smp = 2 nd (B).
Because s is conservatively strictly rational, by Claim 3 we have that for each i,
By the construction of M we have that for each reward δ i in Step e,
Letting (a, P ) be the outcome of s, we have that for each i = a,
If a = , then by the construction of M we have that
where the first inequality holds because P a equals either max j =a v j − δ a or v a − δ a , and v a ≥ max j =a v j , and the second inequality because v j ≥ smp j for each j.
If a = , then we have that
Accordingly, whether or not a equals , we always have P a ≥ 2 nd (B) − δ a , and thus
Therefore Theorem 3 holds. Q.E.D.
THREE CONCERNS ABOUT THE SECOND-BELIEF MECHANISM "IN PRACTICE"
A concern raised about the second-belief mechanism is that " rewards" may not be enough motivation for the players to participate. When the relevant players opt to "stay at home", the second-belief benchmark cannot be guaranteed, and thus the second-price mechanism might in practice generate higher revenue.
Let us have a closer look. First, it should be appreciated that any rational player prefers a positive utility, no matter how small, to 0 utility, which is the utility he would receive if he opted out of the auction, both in the second-belief and the second-price mechanism. (Saying otherwise requires an alternative notion of rationality. 15 ) Second, as we have already observed, conservative beliefs are implicit in any context, whether or not a designer tries to leverage them. Accordingly, to compare properly the second-belief and the second-price mechanism, one should consider the same, underlying, conservative belief profile B. Consider a player i who does not believe that his valuation is the highest. Then i concludes that he will receive " utility" under the second-belief mechanism, and 0 utility under the secondprice one. Therefore, according to any reasonable (traditional or not) notion of rationality, if i chooses to opt out in the second-belief mechanism, he should also opt out in the second-price mechanism. In neither mechanism, therefore, can player i be relied upon to achieve the corresponding revenue benchmark. Consider now a player i who believes that he might be the one with the highest valuation. Then, in either mechanism, it is dominant for him to participate in the auction. (In particular, in the second-belief mechanism, opting out is strictly dominated by (0, θ i ), which always has positive utility.) Accordingly, if i chooses to participate the second-price mechanism, he should also participate the second-belief one.
Another (related) concern was raised for the case in which the players only have very unprecise external beliefs. In this case, while the revenue generated by the secondprice mechanism is equal to the second-highest valuation, 2 nd (θ), the one generated by the second-belief mechanism is "2 nd (θ)− ." Again, such a concern is based on an "unfair" comparison. The second-belief mechanism works no matter what beliefs the seller may have about the quality of the players' conservative beliefs, and insists on guaranteeing strictly positive utilities to the players (when they play conservatively). By contrast, the second-price mechanism only guarantees that the players' utilities are ≥ 0, and thus cannot guarantee the participation of players who believe that they do not have the highest valuation. Accordingly, for the seller to gain an extra in revenue by adopting the second-price mechanism instead of the second-belief one, it is necessary that he has enough information about the players: namely, he must be sure that each player believes that he might be the one with the highest valuation. In absence of this information, to guarantee the participation of all players, the second-price mechanism must be modified so as to provide some form of " rewards" as well, and thus will miss its target revenue in its purest form.
A third concern raised is that the second-belief mechanism may miss its benchmark because its players may prefer decreasing their opponents' utilities to increasing their own ones. Indeed, if (1) the player with the highest valuation is player i, (2) i believes that he is the player with the highest valuation, (3) i believes that θ i ≥ 2 nd (B), and (4) i further believes that 2 nd (B) > 2 nd (θ), then, when all other players act rationally, by sufficiently underbidding his own valuation -e.g., by bidding (0, 0)-player i will cause another player to receive negative utility. However, let us emphasize that, while leveraging the players' external beliefs, we continue to use the classical utility function for single-good auctions: namely, the utility of every player equals his true valuation minus the price he pays if he wins the good, and 0 minus the price he pays otherwise. Under such a classical utility function, the second-belief mechanism achieves its benchmark at every rational play. The concern about a player having a different type of preference is therefore out of the model.
